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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On March 3 , 1894, William Ewart Gladstone , leader of the Liberal
party for twenty years and the possessor of a political life that
stretched back to 1832 , resigned the office of Prime Minister because of
With this resignation, an

his opposition to an expanded nava l program.
era ended in English politics.

Into Gladstone's place as First Minister of Her Majesty's Government
and effective leader of the crumbling Liberal party, stepped Archibald
Phillip Primrose , the 5th Earl of Rosebery.

Lord Rosebery had been

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Mr. Gladstone's last Government.
He was a wealthy young aristocrat whose Liberal Imperialistic views on
foreign policy were more similar to those of the Tory leader, Lord Salisbury,
than those of Mr. Gladstone.
When Lord Ros�bery became Prime Minister of Great Britain changes of
great importance were occurring in European political circles.

These

changes had started before Lord Rosebery became Premier, and they
continued during and after his term of office.
On the European continent itself, the Emperor Wil liam II of Germany
had dismissed , in March of 1890, the famous Chancellor , Prince Otto Von
Bismarck.

Into his place were put a group of minor diplomats who had

neither the knowledge nor the ability to replace the older statesman.

The

Reinsurance Treaty , s igned by Germany and Russia in June of 1887, and which
had· pledge·d Russian neutrality in the event of a Franco-German war , no

2
longer existed.

Gone too were the Mediterranean Agreements between

Austria , England , and Italy, which had arranged for the maintenance of
the status quo in the Near East.

These were serious events for Germany ,

for she had now lost the contact she had formerly had with England and
Russia. l
The other Great Power on the continent, France, was by the nature o f
her expanding program of imperialism, coming to be a t variance with
England.

Not only were relations becoming more and more strained , but

war itself had nearly ensued between the two Powers in the sunnner o f 1893.
The story of this crisis illustrates just one of the many instances when
French and British interests were at odds.
This crisis arose over Siam, an area long of interest to the British
because it lay between the British possession o f Burma and the Indo-Chinese
possessions of France.

When France declared war on Siam in 1893 over a

border dispute, the British at once sent war ships to Bangkok.

The

French had declared an extremely stiff ultimatum to the Siamese government
and blocked the coast.

The British ships , along with other neutral

vesse l s , were asked to leave the area.

Lord Rosebery , then Secretary for

Foreign Affair s , telegraphed the ships not to leave , and then notified
the French of his action.

At the same time, Lord Rosebery convinced the

Siamese government to accept the French ultimatum i f it were given in a
modified form.

Because of the strength of this move , the French

modified their demand s , Siam then accepted them. and the British ships
were recalled. 2

This cri s i s , however , gave rise to other territorial

lRaymond Sontag, Germany and England, 1848-1894 (New York:
and Russell Inc. , 1964) , p . 298.
2

Russell

G. P. Gooch· and J. W. Ward (ed s . ) , The Cambridge History of British
Foreign Policy (New York: The Macmi llan Co. , 1923 ) , p . 198.
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questions between France and Great Britain which were not settled for
three years.
To make the European situation even more complex, the Franco-Russian
entente developed between 1891 and 1893 and was to culminate in 1894 into a
definite military alliance.
Russia was to

Italy.

aid

France

By the terms of this highly secret agreement

if Fronce

was

attacked by Germany or Germany and

The French for their part were to aid Russia if she was attacked

by Germany or Germany and Austria.

This alliance, even though its precise

terms were unknown to the other Powers , had the effect o f putting Germany
even further adrift in her international relations since she now faced
the possibility of a two front war. 3
England , for her part in the international relations of the 1890 ' s ,
was remaining aloof, choosing to ally with no one Power while playing for
assistance from nearly a l l of them.

Germany , because of this attitude,

and because of English opposition to German colonialism in Africa and
other places, such as Samoa , adopted a brusque attitude toward England.
This semi-hostile attitude i s amply displayed in the fol lowing excerpt
from a popular German newspaper:
Too long (has) Germany tolerated this opposition (to
German colonialis � ) . Today our patience is exhausted.
England went too far. The English government can no
longer doubt that Germany has the strength and the will
to prevent further obstruction of her colonial develop
ment. There is no question here of enmity, or of hatred
towards England. It is a question only of protecting
German interests. The rulers of England should recognize
clearly that they can accomplish more by altering their
colonial policy than by trying to frighten us by the
susposed isolation of Germany. 4
3David Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon (New York:
1962)' p . 491.

Alfred A . Knopf,

4 ner Kolnesche Zeitung, November 2 0 , 1894, a s quoted in Raymond
Sontag, Germany and England, 1848-1894.
(New York: Russell and Russell
Inc. , 1964 ) , pp. 303-304.
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When Lord Rosebery complained of this att itude to Count Hatzfeldt,
�he German ambassador at London, Hatzfeldt reminded him that for years
Germany had sought an Anglo-German all iance.

Lord Ro sebery then professed

the standard reply that the British public would never permit any more
than an informal understanding with any foreign power. 5
This incident enun.ciated the whol e attitude of England in the years
of 1890-1896.

She was not prepared to bind herself to a permanent

alliance when British interests were not directly concerned and to
cooperate only temporarily and informally where British interests were
directly concerned relying on her large navy to off set the lack o f any
permanent a l l iance.
The Germans, however , were not unduly worried by the lack of British
cooperation.

They knew that although they could make no a l l iance with

England , there was even less chance that an a l l iance would be made
between the English and the French or the English and the Russians.
Germany well realized that the tremendous Empire of England kept her
from aligning with any country where a conflict of colonial interest was
liable to occur.
In England itse l f , important social changes were occurring.

The

English population, as it had for the previous fifty year s , was becoming
more and more urban.

The workingmen o f England were turning more and

more to organizations other than the State for their betterment.
Trades and labor unions were becoming increa singly popular.

The rrbloom

on the grapes of Liberalism was fading" before it could fully mature. 6
5Raymond Sontag, Germany and England, 1848- 1894 (New York:
and Russell Inc. , 1964) p. 304.

Russell

6oavid Thomson, England in The Nineteenth Century, 1815-1914 (Baltimore :
Penguin Book s , 1950 ) , p . 191.
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The Liberal party had appealed to the country as the party concerned
with the masses.

Now, the masses were turning e lsewhere.

In England too there was an increasing feel ing of patriotism that
emerged in an ambitious colonial policy.

This intense spirit, the flames

of which were fanned by writers such as Rudyard Kipling and papers such
as the Evening News , was supported throughout the whole o f the Eng lish
social strata.

Perhaps this feel ing was generated because, as one

authority has written, the new , lower middleclass city-dwellers, bored
by their hum-drum , everyday existence in the workaday world , wanted to
hear of exciting events , performed by their countryn1en in far o f f , exotic
places for the benefit of the British Err.pire. 7
Political leaders , mostly of the Conservative party , as well as the
man in the street, supported the expansionist ideas of imperialists.
Even some Liberal s , who had the courage to oppose the ideas of
Mr.

Gladstone , supported a far reaching colonial policy.

Lord Rosebery,

the leading Liberal Imperialist, stated his feel ings expressively.
The Empire that is sacred to me is sacred for this reason,
that I bel ieve it to be the noblest examp le yet known to
mankind of free, adaptable just goverrunent
When a
connnunity is in distress or under oppression, it aiways looks
f irst to Great Britain; while in cases which are quite
unsuspected , I think , by Great Britain at large , and which
are only known to Ministers , they constantly wish in some form
or other to be united to our country and to enjoy our
goverrunent. 8
•

•

•

•

•

•

In domestic pol itics in England then, the Conservatives stood firm
while the Liberal party was divided.

The Liberals were divided not only

on imperial ism (opposed by Gladstone , W. V. Harcourt , John Morley and
others) , but were also divided on the issue of Irish Home Rul e , which had
7David Thomson, England in The Nineteenth Century, 1815-1914 (Baltimore :
Penguin Book s , 1950), p . 192.
8w i l l iam A. Langer , The Diplomacy of Imper ialism (New York:
Knopf, 1935) , p . 93.

Al fred A.
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been defeated in Mr. Gladstone ' s last Ministry.

The Liberals had only a

precarious majority of forty in the commons, while only about f ive per cent
of the Lords was composed of Liberals.
From this brief sketch of English political and social l ife during
the 1890's we can see that this England was not the sturdy, united England
of thirty or forty yearR hefore.

Her

political leaders in a major party

were divided , her social composition rapidly changing, her press
jingoistic , her population ambitious for excitement but afraid of danger.
It was in the midst of this uncertainty and because of it as wel l , that
Lord Rosebery became Premier of England on the 3rd of March, 1895.
Lord Rosebery became Premier, it is generally conceded , because of
the pre ference of Queen Victoria, and because the leading Liberal
statesmen did not wish to see the disagreeable W. V. Harcourt , Liberal
majority leader in the House of Conunons, become Prime Minister. 9
The reaction to the new Premier was mixed.

In commenting on Lord

Rosebery's abilities, the Spectator gave the following not very reassuring
views:
He is as full of indecisions as Mr. Gladstone was full
of decisions , and is always trying to throw up straws to
show him which way the wind blows. Naturally enough in a
democracy so little educated, the wind b lows in a l l sorts of
little eddies, and poor Lord Rosebery, like a child's windmil l ,
turns now to one point of the compass, now to another.
Whoever may be fit to guide our raw democracy , Lord Rosebery
is at least not the man. 10
To Edward Dicey, however , writing in the Fortnightly Review, Lord
Rosebery "both as Foreign Secretary and as Chairman of the London
9Robert Rhodes James, Rosebery (London:
1963 ) , p. 300.

Wiedenfelt and Nicholson,

l Or' Lord Rosebery's Weakness" The Spectator , LXXII, November 17 , 1894,
p. 686.

7
County Council

•

•

•

displayed many qualities which commanded the

confidence of the British pub l ic. rdl
The view of at least one Frenchman was expre ssed in the same
magaz ine.

He said:

He possesses some of our favorite characteristics
without any of the faults with which we reproach the
English when we are out of temper with them. He doesn't
preach, he never talks through h i s nose, he exhibits
neither Puritan cant nor academic pendantry nor
aristocratic haughtines s . 12
The German view given in the same publication envisioned Rosebery
as a nonentity, known only to the German people r cto have married a
daughter of the house of Rothschild , to be a friend of Herbert
Bismarck ' s , and to own a horse which has won a famous race. 11 1 3

The

author , a German historian, felt that Lord Rosebery's combination of
"Radicalism and imperialism'r would result in failure if the Radicals
remained in power in England and had a chance to carry their program
to its logical end.
The Times gave this opinion of Lord Rosebery and his prospective
Premiership:
Disregarding the example and influence of some of his
political teachers and masters ( e . g. Mr. Gladstone), he has
taken from the beginning of h i s political life a keen interest
in all that appertains to the expansion and consolidat ion of
the Empire. He is accordingly disliked by .. 11 the "Little
England11 faction; but the English people are believers in
the great England bequested them by their ancestors and built
up by the strenuous effort of generations.
<

Lord Rosebery has reverted to the faith of Pitt and
Palmer ston. That he has done so is to our own belief
11 Edward Dicey, "Lord Rosebery , " Fortnightly Review, XLVI (December ,
1894)' p . 746.
12Augustine. Filon , '�oreign Views of Lord Rosebery-Fran ce , 'r
Fortnightly Review, LXII (December, 1894 ) , p . 761.
13Edward Dicey, rrLord Rosebery, r r Fortnightly Review , XLVI
(December, 1894) , p . 770.
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one of the principle factors in the popular confidence he
enjoys to a far greater extent than any other member of
the party except Mr. Gladstone. 14
The two fol lowing quotations can be taken as good examples of the
reaction toward Rosebery's ascendancy by members of the two parties.
Joseph Chamberlain, a leader of Conservative party, felt that 11Mr.
Gladstone was one of those of whom it was sometimes s�id that his
earnestness ran away with his judgement, but Lord Rosebery a llows his
judgement to be run away with by the earnestness of other people.rr l S
L. Atherly-Jones, however, a Liberal member o f parliament , expressed
the view in a letter to the London Times that Lord Rosebery would be a
strong leader, and that nin r.espect of our international relations
Lord Rosebery enjoys in a single degree the confidence of h i s fellow
citizens and the respect of foreign statesmenrr alike. 1 6

These of

course were strictly party views and must be accepted as such , but they
probably mirrored the feelings of the majority of people aligned behind
their respective parties.
Lord Rosebery himsel f was somewhat reluctant to accept the leadership
of the nation.

Realizing full well that leading a divided party with a·

sma l l majority would be a difficult task, he appreciated what lay ahead
of him as Prime Minister.
'

Some of his own party's leader s , particularly

W. V. Harcourt , who felt that a s leader of the majority in the House of
Commons he should have rightfully been Premier , tried to interfere with
his perogatives as First Minister.

Rosebery enunciated his apprehensions

in a letter to Sir Henry Ponsonby , secretary to Queen Victoria:
14The Times (London) , March 5 , 1894, p . 9 .
15E.

T . Raymond , The Life of Lord Rosebery (New York :
Co. , 1923 ) , p . 138.
16The Times (London) , March 6 , 1894 , p . 7 .

George N. Doran

9
My Dear Ponsonby,
Things are not going very well. One or two of my
colleagues in the Commons are endeavoring to impose
conditions--upon me--one of which is that the new Foreign
Minister shall be in the Commons.
I have refused to submit to any conditions not
I don't want to
ordinarily imposed on a Prime Minister.
be Prime Minister at all , but if I am to be , I must be
a real one. I h�vc told them that if this condition is
pressed I will throw up my commission at once. That is
how matters stand. Of course , all this is for the Queen,
but I prefer to tell her informally through you. 17
I am respectfully yours ,
Rosebery
and again in a letter to the Queen herse l f , Rosebery repeated his reluctance
to assume office.
he felt it his duty to inform :Your Maj esty
of at least some of the objections he sees to the task
of reconstituting the Government. Nothing can diminish
his sense of these objections but he cannot resist Your
Maj esty ' s appeal , and will endeavour to carry out Your
Majesty's wishes. 18
•

•

•

•

•

•

With these uncertain words Lord Rosebery became Prime Minister of
Great Britain, an office' which he held for the ensuing fifteen months.
This paper will examine the conduct of foreign affairs during those
fifteen months.

It is hoped that along with an examination of the

events that transpired under Rosebery ' s leadership , an evaluation can
be made of his conduct of foreign affairs.

17 Lord Rosebery to Sir Henry Ponsonby , March 1 , 1894. Letters of
Queen Victoria , (Longmans , Green and Co. , 1931) third series , II , p . 33.
18Lord Ros� bery to Queen Victoria , March 3 , 1894. Letters of Queen
Victoria , (Longmans , Green and Co. , 1931) third series, I I , p. 3 7 .

CHAPTER II
LORD ROSEBERY
Archibald Philip Primrose, the fifth Earl of l\osebery and Fi.r st
Minister of Great Britain from March 3 , 1894, until June 24, 1895, was
born in London on May 7 , 1848.

He was the son of Arci1ibald, Lord

Dalmeny and of Catherine, the daughter of the fourth Earl of Stanhope.
Lord Rosebery received his early education at 3righton and then
at Eton, where he formed a fondness for the school that stayed with him
for the remainder of his life.

Shortly before his death in 1929,

Rosebery instructed a servant to purchase a gramaphone and to play on
i t , as Rosebery lay dying, the Eton boating son3 .
While a t Eton, Rosebery became a favorite pupil of William Johnson,
a teacher who lived in the same house as Rosebery.

Although a n

exceptionally intell igent student the young aristocrat was not a n
exceedingly industrious one, and Johnson was to write another teacher
that he would give him a irpiece of plate11 if he could get some work
out of him.

Rosebery, Johnson wrote , 11is one of those who like the

palm without the dust.11 19

Although later in his political career Lord

Rosebery showed that he was capable of working hard and long, this
phrase was often used as a weapon against him by his political opponents .
Johnson also commented during Rosebery1 s last year a t Eton that Rosebery
"will be an orator, and if not a poet, such a man a s poets delight in. rr20
19The Marquess of Crewe, Lord Rosebery (London:
193 1 ) , p. 15.
20 ibid. , p. 1 5.

Harper and Bros.,
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After graduation from Eton in 1865, Rosebery spent the next few
months at the home of his s tepfather (his own father had died and his
mother had remarried during his early childhood).

It was here that he

met Benjamin Disraeli, with whom he had several long talks.

Although

within three years of this meeting Lord Rosebery was to declare his
stand with the Liberal party , it is more likely than not that the young
man ' s ideas concerning foreign policy were in some manner colored by
the influence of the great Conservative.

Apparently he impressed

Disraeli too , for Mr s . Disraeli told young Rosebery that her husband
had mentioned that he wished Rosebery could take a seat in the Commons
for the Conservative party.
In 1865 Rosebery entered Oxford, and it was while he was a
university student that a friend of his mother's asked if he would
be interested in running for Parliament.

Because he felt he would

have a chance to sit in the Commons for only a short time before he
inherited his title, he declined .

Indeed little interest in politics

was shown during this period of Ro sebery ' s life, for when he became
a peer in 1868 he declined the request of Lord Granvi l l e , Liberal
leader in the Lor d s , that he make a seconding speech for Mr. Gladstone.
However , in his letter declining the invitation, he stated that his
•rprivate sympathy and

•

•

•

reason have been wholly enlisted in the

Liberal cause for some years.u21
It is clear then that· at this early date in his life Lord Rosebery
had assumed the ideas and political philosophies that were to determine
his political life until early in the twentieth century.
2 1 The Marquess of Crewe , Lord Rosebery (London:
1931 ) , p . 18.

Harper and Bros.,
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Because of this early devotion to Liberalism, Lord Rosebery was soon
attracted to Mr. Gladstone and his followers.

Lord Rosebery had taken

his seat in the House o f Lords in 1868, and by 1871 he was a fol lower of
Lord Granville.

Mr.

Gladstone had by this time already become a

personal friend of Lord Rosebery.

The letters Rosebery received from

him irwere marked by ancient courtesy and paternal kindness,

as they

were throughout the remainder of Mr. Gladstone ' s life. rr22
In February of 1872 Lord Rosebery was asked by Mr. Gladstone to
represent in the House o f Lords the Board of Rating for the Liberal
Government.

Rosebery accepted and started on the long road of service

to Mr. Gladstone and the Liberal party that reached through the years
to 1900.

Lord Rosebery had made a distinct impression on the old

leader who once remarked "He is very decidedly a remarkable man, not a
mere clever man:

•

•

•

From the first time I ever saw him I liked him

and thought highly of him. cr23
In the late 1 87 0 ' s when Mr. Gladstone ended his self imposed
retirement and spoke out against the Disraeli Government ' s action during
the Bulgarian atrocities and the Congress of Berlin , Lord Rosebery was in
full agreement.

In 1878 and early 1879 he p l ayed a prominent part in

convincing Mr. Gladstone to stand as the Liberal candidate for Midlothian
County. 24
Mr.

After the campaign which drew thousands upon thousands to hear

Gladstone , and which gave him a victory, Lord Rosebery was offered

no Cabinet post.

He then chose to take no post at al l , a decision which

has been attributed to anger at his exclusion from the Cabinet as wel l as
to the circulation of rumors that his part in the campaign was motivated
22 Robert Rho9es James , Rosebery (London:
1963 ) , p. 63.
23 Ibid . , p . 107 .
24 Ibid . , p . 9 2 .

Wiedenfeld and Nicolson,
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primarily by a desire for public office.

This somewhat contradictory

reaction reveal s , perhaps , an element of aristocratic pride in his
character.

In any case he was at the time recovering from an attack

of scarlet fever, and felt that he could not hold an office had it
been given him. 2 5
By

1881, he had recovered from his illness and was given a position

in the Government as Under Secretary for the Home Office.

Evidently

bored with h i s somewhat trivial dutie s , Rosebery resigned after two
years service; he apparently was more interested in policy than
He returned to office, however , in a more congenial position

routine.

a s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Gladstone Government
of 1885--despite his d ifference of opinion with the o l d leader on how
foreign affairs were to be conducted.

This ministry fell in the same

year , but when Gladstone returned to power in 1892 , Rosebery was once
again in the Foreign Office.

There he "displayed a prickly independence

from his Prime Minister which. pained the latter, but Rosebery's spirit
was serviceable to England in the only foreign crisis of importance, a
dispute with France (previously described) in 1893 about the frontiers ·
of Siam

•

rr26

It was when this ministry fell that Rosebery became

Premier.
In order to understand why Rosebery acted as he did when he became
Prime Minister , it is necessary to examine his attitudes concerning
imperialism and the maintenance o f foreign affairs when he a ssumed a
position of leadership.
25
Robert Rhodes James , Rosebery (London:
1 9 6 3 ) ' p. 96.

Wiedenfeld and Nicolson,

2 6J . L. Hammond and M. R. D. Foote, Gladstone and Liberalism
(London: English Universities Pre s s , 1952 ) , p. 196.
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Throughout his life, first a s a private citizen, then a s a member
of the Hou se of Lords , and finally as a member of the Cabinet and Prime
Minister, Lord Rosebery was an avowed imperialist.

As early a s 1874,

for example, he has spoken of the glories of colonization in an address
to the Social Science Congre ss in Glasgow:
Our race has colonised and colonises , has influenced and
influence s , and in future ages seems likely to further
colonise and influence, a great part of the globe. So great
has been our field of influence, that we can only view it
with awe. It has been , and i s , a great destiny for this
country to sway so mightily the destinies o f the universe
We have no right , perhap s , to hope that we may be an
exception to the rule by which nations have their period
of growth, and of grandeur, and of decay. It may be that
all we most esteem may fade away like the glories of
Babylon. But if we have done our duty we
even though
our history should pass away, and our country become
' an island salt and bare
the haunt of seals and arcs and seamews clang, '
she may be remembered , not ungratefully , a s the mother of
great commonwealths and peaceful empires that shall perpetuate
the best qualities of the race. 27
•

•

•

•

•

•

In 1885 , before he became Minister for Foreign Affairs in
Mr.

Gladstone's third Government , Lord Rosebery again voiced his

imperial views:
The other day I was described, and I think truly
described , as a Liberal Imperialist. So far a s I understand
these two words , that is a perfectly accurate description.
If a Liberal Imperialist means that I am a Liberal
passionately attached to the Empire and interested intensely
in the best means of sustaining and promoting the interes t s
o f the Empire; i f i t means
that I am a Liberal who
believes that the external policy of Great Britain is one
that should be founded not on independent attitudes of our
own
if these be accurate descriptions of what a
Liberal Imperialis t i s , then I am a Liberal Imperialist. 2 8
•

•

•

•

•

•

These comments with reference to Liberal Imperialism s�ould concern
us here, because Rosebery ' s concep t s of the Empire and o f the foreign
27 The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery (London:
1901 ) , p p . 68-69.
28 Ibid., p. 7 5 .

A. L. Humphrie s ,
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policy it forced upon late nineteenth century England were unusual for a
Liberal Minister.

From 1865 until 1894, the Liberal party was so

dominated by Gladstone that his ideas became the accepted program of
the Liberal party a s a whole.
Gladstone ' s views concerning foreign policy were best summed up by
Gladstone himself.

In 1869, in a letter to the Queen ' s secretary,

Gladstone , who was then Prime Minister, stated his outlook.

He wrote

that he felt it was a situation fraught with extreme danger for England to
a ssume alone an advanced , and therefore i solated , position
in regard to European controversies; that come what may it
is better for her to ?romise too little than too much:
that she should not encourage the weak by giving expecta
tions of aid, to resist the strong , but should rather seek
to deter the strong by firm but moderate language , from
agression on the weak; that she should seek to develope
and mature the action of a common or public or European
29
opinion a s the best standing bulwark against wrong
•

•

•

Gladstone again stated his view s , even more explicitly, on
November 2 7 , 1879, at West Calder, during his campaign for a seat in
Parliament for Midlothian :
Here is my first principle of foreign policy:
government at home.

good

My second principle of foreign policy is thi s : that
it ought to be to preserve to the nations of the world the
b l e s sings o f peace
•

•

•

My third principle is this: to strive to cultivate and
maintain , aye, to the very uttermos t , what is called the
concert of Europe; to keep the Powers of Europe in union
together.
My fourth princi?le i s : that you avoid needless and
entangleing engagement s . You may boast about them, you
may brag about them, you may say you are procurri�g considera
tion for the country. You may say that an Englishman can now
hold his head up among nations. You may say that he i s now
not in the han d s of a Liberal ministry , who thought of
29J. L. Hammond and M. R. D. Foote, Gladstone and Liberalism (London:
English Universities Press, 1952 ) , pp. 114, 115.
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nothing but pounds , shil lings , and pence. But what does a l l
this come t o gentlemen? It comes to thi s , that you are
increasing your engagements without increasing your strength,
you really reduce the Empire and do not increase it. You
render it an inheritance l e s s precious to hand on to future
generations.
to acknowledge the equal

My fifth principl e is this:
rights of a l l nations
•

Let me give

•

•

you a sixth and

I

have done.

forei gn policy should always be
And that sixth is
J
inspired with the love of freedom . O
•

•

•

These, then, were the ideas that made up the bulk of the political
thought of the Liberal party concerning foreign affairs.
With the first , second , third, fifth and sixth principles expounded
by Mr. Gladstone , Lord Rosebery was in tot&l agreement.
principle he could not and would not agree.

With the fourth

Lord Rosebery re�ained a

true disciple of imperialism and of the strong hand throughout his public
career.

In his heart and mind, Lord Rosebery always felt that the

Empire and its protection was a cause rrfor which anyone might be content
to live ;
to die.1

•

�1

.

. a cause for which, if needs b e , anyone might be content
It was this attitude, this strongly rooted and deep seated

feeling and belief, that guided his conduct of foreign affairs from
March 3 , 1894, until June 2 4 , 1895.

30charles Adams (ed.) Representative British Orations (London:
G. P. Putnam , 1897 ) , pp. 320-3 2 3.
3 1 The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery (London:
p . 47 .

A . L. Humphri e s , 1901),

CHAPTER III
AFRICA I
Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century the European
Powers were engaged in an a lmost frantic rrrace for empire . "

Despite

the efforts of anti-imperialists within the governments of the Powers ,
colonialists kept the upper hand and imperialism continued almost unabated.
Africa was a prime target for colonization and every major Power had at
least a foothold there.

In this situation conflict was bound to occur,

and as we shall see later in this chapter, did.

European diplomatists

found themselves facing questions in Europe that were caused by colonial
possessions thousands of miles away while foreign ministers were forced
to spend a great deal of time and energy trying to unravel tangled
problems caused by colonization.

England , France , Ge rniany , Italy and

others were all involved to one extent or another in the whole colonial
adventure.
It was in this context that Lord Rosebery faced the first issue in
foreign affairs to come before his Government.
In June of 1892 the British East Africa Company which, since 1890
had been in control of the vast territory of Uganda, had reviewed its
interests.there and determined that it could no longer bear the expense
of administering that territory.

Lord Rosebery , at that time foreign

secretary to Mr. Gladstone , was determined not to let Uganda slip from

17
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British control, for his imperialist orientation was strengthened by the
likelihood that massacre and anarchy would follow.

The foreign office

was also reluctant to release an area that would give free access to
other European Powers to the valley of the Nile, considered by England to
be her sphere of influence.

In order to prevent these contingencies the

British government, at the insistence of Rosebery, persuaded the Company
In the

to postpone its withdrawal for a period of several months.
meantime the explorer,

Sir Gerald Portal, was sent to examine the

situation and to make reconnnendations for the future of Uganda.
The reports sent back by Portal indicated that Lord Rosebery was not
alone in his belief that adverse consequences would follow a British
withdrawal from Uganda.
December 6,

1893,

In a message to Rosebery that was received on

Sir Gerald wrote:

I fear that withdrawal of the present control,

consequent loss of prestige might have consequences

and the
•

•

which would shake the positions of Europeans throughout

•

East and Central Africa and would result seriously in the

neighboring colonies of Germany, Italy and the Congo State.

32

Bishop Alfred Tucker, residing in Mombasa, had already expressed
similar views in a letter to Portal, dated March 30,

1893:

Should her majesty's Government decline to undertake

the expense and responsibility involved in the adminis

tration of this country, it is my firm conviction that

the consequ nces that must inevitably ensue would be most
j3
disastrous.
The problem of Uganda arose and developed while Rosebery was foreign
secretary.

It was,

however, due to his action as Prime Minister that the

problem was finally solved.
32Great Britain,

Events were developing slowly, due to the

Parliamentary Papers, Vol.

LVII,

"Reports Relating to Uganda by Sir Gerald Portal," p.
33Ibid., P• 39.

cmd.

30.

7307,

1894,
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lack of communication and the tremendous distances involved, and as the
London Times pointed out on January 8,

1894:

The final consideration of the East African question,

which had been postponed until his

(Portal's) return,

has

only now entered upon the stage from which some decision
3
can be expected. 4

1894, that

It was not until three months past this date, on April 12,
the Government, now under Rosebery's direction, took any action.

On that

date the British East Africa Company was bought out and its administration
was taken over by the British Government.

On June 18,

1894,

the British

formally established a protectorate over Uganda and the situation was
then resolved.

The conditions in Uganda remained stable and a year

later it was announced that •ta railway from the coast was to be begun
as soon as possible and that the territory between Uganda and the sea
was to be placed under a British protectorate.ir35

The Uganda question

is an interesting study for it was not purely a colonial question,
although it was indeed concerned with African colonial policy, but was
also a question of foreign policy in that its settlement was motivated,
in part at least, by a desire to block foreign aspirations in what had
been traditionally considered a British sphere of influence.
It was this same desire that involved Lord Rosebery in two more
African problems, first with the French in Harrar and then with the
French and Germans in Central Africa.
In 1888 the British government had signed with France an agreement
which dealt in part with the province of Harrar in Abyssinia.
Article

IV

of that agreement, the two governments pledged not to annex

34The Times (London), January 8,
p.

1894, p.

8.

35The Foreign Policy of Lord Rosebery (London:

39.

In

A.

L.

Humphries,

1901),
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Harrar, a caravan route terminal, nor to make it a protectorate.

At the

same time, however, the governments did not renounce the right to oppose
attempts of a third power to bring the province under its control.

This

agreement had been signed to lessen Franco-British tensions along the
Red Sea.

The next year, however, the Italians had signed a treaty with

the ruler of Abyssinia in which he recognized Italian control over all
of Abyssinia, including Harrar.36
Although at the time the treaty was concluded the British complained,
the Rosebery Government took advantage of the situation by reaching an
agreement contrary to the spirit if not the letter of England's agreement
William Longer has described the circumstances concisely:

with France.

It was concerned
On.May 5, 1894, a new treaty was signed.
chiefly with the delimitation of the frontier between British
Somaliland and the areas claimed by the Italians.

But there

was a ''Note Officieuse annexee au Protocol" which, despite the

Anglo-French Treaty of 1888 relating to Harrar;

abandoned this

province to Italy, while at the same time a "Declaration

Secrete" allowed England to act there and regard it as part of

her sphere until Italy was prepared to take over.
the chief approach to Abyssinia.

Harrar formed

The new arrangement

•

•

•

would
block any attemp t by France to establish control
over this strategic point . 3 7
•

•

•

Although the British government's actions concerning Uganda and Harrar
partly blocked French designs in Africa,

there was still one more avenue

through which Britain's interests in the "dark continent" could be menaced.
This avenue was the Congo Free State.
Belgium,

·controlled by Leopold II of

this neutral State had been founded by him in 1878.

It began

its existence as the International Association of the Congo when a number
of conunittees were established to undertake the job of setting up the
3

6william

Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism

Knopf, 1935), p. 109.
37Ibid.,

pp. 130,

131.

(New York:

Alfred A.
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new country.

Leopold had corranissioned the famed explorer H.

to establish a series of stations along the Congo River.

M.

Stanley

He was to also

make treaties with the native chiefs and to construct a road between the
upper Nile and the Congo estuary near the sea.

The International

Association was recognized in 1884 and 1885 by the Powers of Europe as
the Congo Free State and Leopold was acknowledged as sovereign of the

'
newly created State by the Belgian Chamber in 1885.

This State, then,

bordering on France's sphere in Africa, was another area through which
England felt France could threaten her interests.in the Sudan.
The problem England faced in the spr ing of 1894 had arisen from
her relatively recent involvement in Egyptian and Sudanese affairs.
the late 1860's when the Suez Canal had been constructed in Egypt,

In
part

of the funds had come from the Egyptian government and part from
European investors.

Because of the expense of the Canal and of certain

other internal improvements undertaken by the Egyptian government the
Egyptian national debt had come to something near ninety million pounds
and this crushing burden had finally forced the Egyptian Khedive to
sell his 177,000 shares of stock in the Canal in 1875.

Disraeli, then

Prime Minister, saw a golden opportunity, and borrowing three million
pounds from Rothschilds, he purchased the stocks for England; 38
The seeds of Britain's future interest in Egypt and consequently the
Sudan were now sown.

Because of the irranense amounts of money owed by

Egypt to English investors, and because of Britain's part ownership of
the Canal, England had a double interest if anything went amiss there.
Her concern was soon aroused by the actions of Ismail Pasha, the Khedive
of Egypt.

In an effort to economize on the expenses of his government,

38william !anger,

Alfred A.

Knopf,

European Alliances and Alignments

1931), p.

274.

( New

York:
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he had reduced the pay of officers of the army by half.

This shortage

of pay, along with growing flames of nationalism fanned by

Arabi,

an army officer, led to a revolt of the army in 1881 and 1882.

Anti-

foreign demonstrations occurred and the British felt intervention to
The French were asked by Gladstone to join but, to

be necessary.

their everlasting regret, did not.

The British then decided to bombard

the fortresses at Alexandria and considered following through with a
landing force.

This action was against the principles that had guided

liberal foreign policy under Gladstone's control, but the foreign
secretary, Lord Granville, who opposed Gladstone's idea of joint
action, justified the bombardment as follows:
A bombardment is a horrible thing,

but it will clear

the air and accelerate a solution of some sort or other.

It is well for a country whose strength is maritime

that naval demonstrations should not be thought to be
absolutely without a sting.

I

am as decided as ever against a dual political

intervention of the English and French.39
On July 11,

1882,

the bombardment was executed and the fortresses reduced.

Desert tribes then began to threaten the Canal and the previously
projected landing force became necessary.

Gladstone, in the dilatory

manner so characteristic of his attitude toward foreign policy delayed
until September before taking action.40

Fortunately the French

government had in the meantime fallen, leaving England with an almost
complete freedom of action in Egypt.

Gladstone was finally forced to

take advantage of the situation and on September 13 the battle of
39Lord Granville to Lord Ampthill,

July 12,

1882.

Harold Temperly

and Lillian Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy, 1792-1902
(Cambridge:
4
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Tel el Kebir was fought.
they entered Cairo.

The British were victorious and on September 15

They were now in control of Egypt,

but as one

authority has commented rrthey could hardly have said themselves how they
managed to get there.u

4l

And because they controlled Egypt,

had claims to the Sudan-- rrthat unknown, undefined,

they also

largely wastelandrr

into which Egyptian conquest had penetrated since the 1820's.

Under

the next Conservative administration (that of Lord Salisbury) this
area was claimed by England as a sphere of influence, and the transition
of Uganda from private administration to that of the British government
suggested penetration of British influence northwards into the Sudan to
meet their penetration southwards from Egypt.

Lord Rosebery, as the

Liberal foreign Minister in 1892 and as Premier in 1894, maintained
British claims and the stage was thus set for a series of diplomatic
conflicts between England and France that were not ended until 1899.
The problems arose because though the Germans recognized the Sudan as a
British sphere,

the French did not,

and thus had no qualms about intrusion

into the area.
It seemed apparent that the French desired to penetrate the Sudan in
order to build a land bridge from their West African possessions to the
Red Sea, possibly through Abyssinia to French Somaliland.

*

The British

were stirred by the resulting threat to their north-south communications
connecting Egypt and Uganda,

essential to the development of British

trade.
4l rbid., p.

276

*
France had taken possession of this small area at the southern end

of the Red Sea,

and bordering also on the Gulf of Aden, in 1892,

name French Somaliland was not adopted until 1896.

but the

24
One author, however, had drawn a plausible case for a fear by the
British that if the French gained control of the lower Sudan they would
in some manner be able to regulate the water supply of Egypt.

The French

would then be able to bring flood or drought at will, and in reality
would control the entire country.

42

It was British insecurity over her

tenuous control of the Sudan, then, which led her in 1894 to sign the
Anglo-Congo Treaty of that year.

Lord Kimberiy,

the foreign secretary,

and Lord Rosebery hoped that by this agreement not only would French
designs on the Sudan be blocked,

but that the Congo Free State would

recognize the Sudan as a British sphere of influence.
The Treaty itself consisted of three main articles.

Article I,

which provided for a rectification of the Congo State's northeastern
and southeastern frontiers, caused no problems.
however, raised an European reaction.

Articles II and III,

Article II leased to King

Leopold for the remainder of his life a large area along the west bank
of the Nile, a region that extended from the "northern point of Lake
Albert Edward to Fashoda and westward as far as the thirteenth meridian
east of Greenwich. "

This would provide an area for Belgian penetration

which would forestall French penetration to the Sudan.

Article III

provided that the Congo State 1rgrants under lease t o · Great Britain to
be administered when occupied, a strip of territory 2 5 kilometers in
breadth, extending from the most northerly point on L. Tanganyika to
the most southerly point of Lake Albert Edward.rr4 3

This third article,

as indicated in a letter by Lord Kimberly, was designed to connect
42 For an explanation of this idea, see Wm. I.anger ' s Diplomacy of

Imperialism, pp.

103- 108,

43 Great Britain,

session 1894,

135.

Parliamentary Papers,
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and Leopold, King of the Belgians", p.

34.
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''Lake Albert Edward,
(in Central Africa)

the Eastern shore of which is in the British sphere
with the leased part.

uninterrupted coIIDllunication

•

•

•

This secures to British trade

(between the two sphere s). 1r44

The

British in short were attempting to build their own bridge of
corranunications from Uganda (just south of the Sudan) ,

southward between

German East Africa and the Congo and by way of Lake Tanganyika,

to

Rhodesia. *
As soon as the treaty was made public, immediate protests were made
by both the French and German goverrunents.
rightly,

The Germans felt, and quite

that their protectorate of German East Africa was being encircled
Baron Von Marschall,

and that their trade interests would thus suffer.
the German foreign secretary,
Count Hatzfeldt,

expressed these fears in a letter to

who was the German ambassador in London:

We see injury to our interests especially in Article III

of the Treaty which contemplates handing over a strip of country
between Lake Tanganyika and Albert Edward.

This would mean the

rish of our protectorate being hemmed in on all sides by
British territory.

We must conclude from this unfriendly

attitude adopted by the British that the neighborhood of the

British on our borders would tend to draw trade away from
our posses sions in that zone.45

Germany did not want a complete split with England on this issue,
but was willing to, and to a certain extent did, cooperate with France.
A further understanding of the German attitude toward the whole matter
and toward cooperation with France can be gleaned from the following
memorandwn by Baron Von Marschall:
44Ibid.
45 Baron Von Marschall to Count Hatzfeld t , May 31, 1894, E.T.S.

(ed. ), German Diplomatic Documents 1871-1914, Vol.

Bros.,

1929), p. 312.

I (London:

Dugdale

Harper and

*Cecil Rhodes British South Africa Company had been chartered in

1889 for development of this area, and the capital,

established in 1890;

Salisbury, had been

the name Rhodesia would not be adopted until 1895.
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The agreement of May 12 was a matter of principle

and impinged on the basic underlying International

Law in Central Africa.

Thus far the interests of Germany,

France and even of other European States coincided.
(This)

•

•

•

made it necessary to consider whether or

not it would be advisable for France and Germany to

take as their basis for negotiation with England the

maintenance of the status quo

•

•

•

if only France

and Germany definitely agreed in the direction
mentioned above and acted accordingly,

would not go for nothing in London. 4 6

their influence

In order t o avoid an open breach with London,

the Germans put most

of the pressure on King Leopold of Belgium and pressed for an inunediate
withdrawal of the Treaty.

Germany's attitude toward Belgium is

displayed in the following telegram from the German foreign office to
the German ambassador in London:
Withdrawal of the Treaty of May 12, and that without

delay, is the only way to avoid complicating the European
situation.

England will learn she cannot treat us as she

chooses and it will give her reason to prefer our friend

ship to our ill will.

We continue to press King Leopold

to withdraw from the Treaty.

If this fails because he is

hoping England will support him, we must refuse to be

responsible if the E�tian Question (between England

and France) is raised and if a conference includes it in

its program. 47

Notable, too, in this conununication is the mention of the Egyptian
question.

This was in reference to Britain ' s contention (recognized by

Germany but not by France) that the Sudan, as Egyptian territory, was
an English sphere of influence.

Now Germany was threatening to

withdraw her support of English influence in the Nile Valley.
were done, it would bring matters to a crisis.
rights in the Sudan, in short,

The question of ' England's

could be approached by an European

challenge to her status in Egypt proper.

This was a consideration that

4 6 Ibid. , Memorandum by Baron Von Marschall, June 1 3 ,
47 Ibid.,

p. 316.

If t his
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1894,
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weighed heavily upon the British, but not a s quickly a s the Germans had
hoped.

That the British had long been aware that just such a development

might arise i s indicated in the following minute by Lord Kimberly, the
English foreign minister, written two months before the Anglo-Congo
question:
This
of March, 1894,
reliance can be
Goverrunent that
Africa
It
strictly on the
. h our riva1 s
wit
•

•

•

•

•

•

.

whole proceeding (a Franco-German agreement
concerning Comeroon) shows how little
placed in the a ssurance of the German
they desire to cooperate with us in
will be neces sary for us now to be
guard against this possible combination
·
48
in
Af rica
•

•

•

·

•

•

•

The first indication that the threat was not immediately having its
desired effect was Rosebery ' s warning that England could return to the
policy of the "free land."

This message was passed to Germany through a

dispatch from the Austrian ambassador in England to the Austrian foreign
office.

In the message Rosebery mentioned that he was "very uneasy

about the political situation in Europe" and that the "attitude of
Germany causes him to ask himself whether England would not do better
to alter her policy (in Africa) and to recover complete freedom of
action. 'r

Rosebery then enunciated the thought that p o s sibly i s the

first indication of England ' s drift from friendship with the Triple
alliance which was to culminate in the Anglo-French entente of 1904.

....
".

In a hey sentence he remarked that "Germany i s a party to the Triple
alliance and if she follows in Africa a policy hostile to England and
48Minute by Lord Kimberly, March 3 1 , 1894. Document 190. Harold
Temper ly and Lillian Penson, Foundations of British Foreign Policy
1792-1902 (Cambridge : Cambridge University Pre s s , 1938 ) , p . 488.
*
England , although not wil ling to bind herself to any permanent
alliance, had for years cooperated in a friendly manner with the
Triple Alliance. Her part in the Mediterranean Agreements of 1887 and
in general diplomatic conduct toward the Central Powers had drawn her
close to Germany. Most of this cooperation was initiated by the
Conservatives but was carried on to a degree under Liberal Ministries.
This cooperation finally ceased in the summer of 1894.
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it will become impossible for the

makes common cause with France,

Cabinet of St. James to maintain her entente with the Triple al liance
in European questions. tr49
In the meantime King Leop o l d , the object of most of the German
protest , was ready to give in when the Germans pointed out that
Article III of the Anglo-Congo agreement was inconsistent with the
Congo-German treaty of November 8 , 1884. 50
was beginning to change his mind.

By this time Lord Rosebery

The Cabinet had not been informed

of the treaty during its negotiation, and when they learned it had been
signed, some members protested strongly.
permission to withdraw from Article

III,

When Leopold asked
the pressure of the Cabinet,

and especially

W. V.

Harcourt, helped lead to Rosebery's consent.

Cabinet alone,

however, did not cause Roseber y ' s reconsideration.

The

There is some indication that he began to fear the wrath of Germany.

On the 16th of June he told Deyrn, the Austrian ambassador, that
after reconsideration he "had come to the conclusion that

•

a

strip of territory 25 kilometers in extent, in Africa, part of it
in desert was not important enough to England to warrant a complete
change in her foreign policy

•

•

rr51

What prompted this comp lete

change in attitude on Rosebery's part in the span of two days w i l l
probably never b e known.

It is probable, however,

that on having

second thoughts he realized how heavily things weighed against him-the fear of German cooperation with France in relation to Egypt, the
49
5
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opposition of

W.

V. Harcourt and other Cabinet members, a healthy

respect for the magnificent German army--all these must have centered
in Rosebery's mind and forced upon him the realization that to remain
immoveable would be madness.

On June 22 the objectionable Article I I I

was bilaterally abrogated by England and Belgium , and thus Rosebery's
scheme to unite England's two spheres of influence in Africa was spoiled.
The protests of the French were paid little heed; and although
the Cabinet criticized the foreign office for the problems it caused
with France as well as with Germany, Rosebery shrugged off the protests
with the remark that "the Anglo-Congo agreement is causing disproportinate excitement in France because France had endeavoured to do the
same thing and failed

•

•

•

n52

Since their protests were ignored by

the British goverrunent it was once again King Leopold who was forced
to yield.

On August 14 he signed an agreement with the Frenc� by

which in return for a rectification of the border between the Congo and
French territory,

King Leopold agreed to :

renounce all occupation and to exercise in the future no

political influence west or north of a line thus determined :
longitude 30° east of Greenwich starting with its

intersection of the watershed of the Congo and Nile
basins,

up to a point where it meets the parallel
5'30° and then along that parallel to the Nile.53

Rosebery did not oppose this action because he felt that Britain
could not compel Leopold to occupy the areas leased to him.

He realized

full well too that there was enough truth in the French accusation that
whoever the lands of the Sudan belonged to, they did not belong to the
British, that this could result in an embarrassing international situation
52 Lord Rosebery to Queen Victoria,

Victoria, third series,

II. p.
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if he pressed Leopold too hard.

The British government then apparently

felt that one of the main objectives of the negotiat ions--to obtain the
recognition o f the British sphere of influence by the Free State--was in
no way,

shape , nor form altered by the action of France.

However ,

in

another very important objective Lord Rosebery had miserably failed-the French still had open access to the Sudan, a problem which was to
lead to the Fashoda incident in

1898.

After this ('wildest piece of

diplomatic jugglery on record , rr the situation in Africa in
at the status quo .

According t o one scholar , however ,

1894

remained

the British

sti l l :
entertained hopes that the comprehensive negotiations on
all African matter s ,

begun in the summer o f

1894,

might yet

issue in a French renunciation of any designs on the Upper
Nile or even a French reconciliation to the British
54
occupation of Egypt itself.
These negot iations , as we shall

see in a later chapter , bore no fruit

and within a year Britain was to be deep in diplomatic conflict with France.
The "Africa Question'r between France and Britain was finally settled only
by a show of force in

1898

during the great crisis at Fashoda.

The next

year an agreement was signed recognizing this fact , but intermittent
trouble between Britain and Germany continued for another fifteen: years.

54
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CHAPTER IV
ASIAN AFFAIRS

In another quarter of the world the political situation was rapidly
changing.

The area was the Far East and the cause of the change was

Japan.
In the short space of some thirty years Japan had risen from a
fifteenth century feudal monarchy to a modern industrialized state.
With the arrival of Japan as a great power new problems came into focus
for the powers of Europe.

Formerly the greatest concern Europe had

shown in the Far East was in how best to carve the decaying Chinese
Empire into more effective spheres of influence.

Now Japan threatened

the interests of the European powers by her aspiration to acquire a
sphere of her own.

This desire, coupled with the fact that Japan' s

geographical proximity to China gave this rap idly rising power a
decided advantage over other European power s , awoke European diplomatists
to an altering balance of power in the East.

The British government

became cognizant of this change as early as July, 1894.

It has been

pointed out that:
Lord Rosebery was among the earliest of European
ministers to become alive to the situation in the Far East
It was Lord Rosebery who led the way for the other
powers
by the treaty of July 1 6 , 1894. 55
•

•

•

. .

•

55The Forei
gn Policy of Lord Rosebery (London:
1901 ) ' p . 52.

A. L. Humphrie s ,

31
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By the terms of this treaty the extraterritorial jurisdiction
of British Consular Courts in Japan was to be abolished within a year,
and Japan was allowed to have
not.

customs tariffs, a s she formerly could

In return restrictions were removed from British trade conducted

in the Japanese Empire. 5

6

As Sir Edward Grey later remarked in his

autobiography :
We had made up our minds that the time had come when

dealings with Japan must be put on the same equal terms

.as exist between nations of European; only so would

cordial political and succes sful conunercial relations be
57

preserved.

Japan however was not content with mere equality in these areas.
She was not diverted from emulating her European models in employing her
industrial and military resources to exert influence over China in the
Sino-Japanese War.
Early in 1894 the Korean government, threatened by rebellion, had
asked the Chinese government for help.

China sent troops and Japan

followed suit as both nations were allowed to do under the terms of the
Tientsian Convention signed in 1885.

However, when the Chinese

government was ready to move its forces, the Japanese came forward with
a plan to arrange reforms in Korea.

The Chinese government refused to

participate and the Japanese took over the Korean administration on
August 1.

They declared war on China the same day.

The British watched these events with interest and not without some
concern, as is indicated in the correspondence between the Prime Minister
and Queen Victoria just prior to Japan ' s declaration of war.
telegram to the Prime Minister on July 30,
56

In a

1894, the Queen expressed her

Ibid., p. 53.

5 7sir Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years

Stocker Co.,

1925 ) ,

p. 22.

(New York:

Frederick A.

33
concern at the way events were moving when she asked "'would not a
joint demonstration by ourselves and Russia be the best thing?
Something must be done speedily to stop what will be a very d isastrous
war. rr58
Lord Rosebery , however , was reluctant to cooperate with Russia in
an intervention.

In his reply to Victoria he indicated his fear of

working only with Russia and mentioned other complications in the affair:
I am rather afraid of joint action in this affair, and
no other power seems inclined to Join. Moreover in any case
we should be too late. Japan is determined to force on a war
and has done so. 59
This opinion was shared by others in the Cabinet and although the policy
received some criticism, it was generally supported throughout England.
An author friendly to the government commented in the Westminister Gazette
more than a year later on Rosebery' s decision.

In that writer ' s eye s :

nothing short o f going to war with Japan ourselves
could have prevented her going to war with China , and it
would have been a strange policy indeed
to divert
those evils (of war) from Japan to ourselves with the
certain prospect of dragging in other European powers who
from jealousy could not have held aloof. 60
•

•

•

The war duly occurred; but after the first Japanese victories in the
early part ·of the war, China informed the British government that she was
seeking an "honorable peace. "

The British, therefor e , sounded the other

powers on an international intervention between the warring nations.
As Lord Rosebery later said:
The British government did not found any great hopes
upon that, but we di. d think it our duty to sound the other
courts of Europe and the United States (to see) if
•

58Queen Victoria to Lord Rosebery, July 3 0 , 1894.
Victoria, third series , II , p . 4 1 7 .

•

•

Letters of Queen

59 Ibid. , Lord Rosebery to Queen Victoria, p . 418.
60The Westminister Gazette ( October 3 , 189 5 ) , quoted in The Foreign
Policy of Lord Rosebery (London: A. L. Humphries , 1901 ) , p. 53.
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there was any possibility of Japan and China coming to
61
terms upon any such conditions
•

•

•

This of fer was spurned by enough of the powers to prevent its
implementation.

Rosebery later described the rejection of the offer as

fol lows :
In the judgement of one or two of them, only one I
think but we will say one or two of them to be within
the confines of truth, it did not appear that the time had
yet arrived when conditions could be put forward with any
advantage to the consideration of the combatants. 62
There was some question raised in England as to why the English
government did not take it upon itself to intervene between the two
nations, and take China ' s considerations to Japan alone.

Lord Rosebery,

who was always an advocate of the concert system, felt that "the more
great powers you have engaged in peace making, the better the peace . "
He believed it was his duty to try and "secure a concert of powers in
all great international concerns.1163

Beyond these reasons lay one

more, perhaps more important than the rest.

Lord Rosebery was, in his

own mind , certain that :
in the jealous condition of things produced by the way in
China and Japan, it would have been madness for this country
to have gone alone and attempted to act as bottle holder
between China and Japan without incurring the suspicion of
every power interested--and all powers are interested--in
the East. 64
According to The Times version of the intervention episode, two
powers had declined , two gave no reply, and only one accepted the British
suggestion. 65

The war, therefore, continued until April 1 5 , 1895, when

China surrendered and the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed.

By the terms

of this arrangement China was, among other things, to cede to Japan:
61The Times (London) , October 2 6 , 1894, p. 10. (From a speech made by
Lord Rosebery on October 24 , at Sheffie l d ) .
62 rbid . , p. 9 .
63 rbid. , p . 1 0 .
64 Ibid.
6 5�Times (London) , October 2 5 , 1894, p . 9 .
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Port Arthur and the peninsula o f Listung, Formosa and the
Decodores Island s , to pay a large indemnity, to grant
Japan the most- favored-nation clause in a new connne rcial
treaty, and to open additional ports to the connnerce of
the world. 66
It was when these terms were announced to the world that Russia ,
France , and Germany decided to intervene and force Japan to retract
some of her conditions.

At this point then, say some authorities,

England did an about face and withdrew her friendship for China and
replaced i t with that o f Japan. 67

In England it seemed as though public

opinion had switched in favor of Japan.

It became evident that England

wanted no part in the repudiation of the Treaty of Shemonoseki.

Lord

Kimberly expressed the government ' s view in a letter to Queen Victoria
when he wrote it would t'be contrary to sound pol icyn if England
interferred , and the "wisest pol icy will be to watch event s , and it
will be time enough to consider whether we should interfere, when
we are convinced British interests are really in danger. rr68

Sir Edward

Grey, then Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs , conunented on
this attitude some thirty years later:
I do not believe that Lord Kimberly had any ulterior
motive in the decision he took not to interfere. We did not
consider that British interests required us to join in this
interference with Japan ' s claims; the threat to her by European
powers appeared harsh and uncal l ed for, and it was repugnant
to join in it. 69
England was then apparently ready to accept Japan as the victor , and
i f necessary to p lay her off against Russia in the Far East.

The

66E . Malcolm Carrol , Germany and the Great Powers 1866-1914 (New York:
Prentice-Hall Incorporated, 1938) , p . 332.
67 see William !anger , The Diplomacy o f Imperialism and E. Malcolm
Carrol , Germany and the Great Powers 1866-1914.
68Earl of Kimberly to Queen Victoria, April 23 , 1895. Letters of
Queen Victoria, third series , II (Longman s , Green and Co. , 193 1 ) , p . 496.
69 sir Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years (New York:
1925) , p. 23.

Frederick Stocker Co. ,
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St. James Gazette expressed this view in its �.arch 18, 1895, issue.

The

magazine stated that if Japan menaced Russia in the East "it is no
affair of our s .

For ourselves, if Japan acts as a counterpoise to the

formidable Empire which is stretching one of its long arms around northern
Asia, we are no losers . . .,iJ 0
This attitude was to play an important role later in the cordial
relations between England and Japan that culminated in the AngloJapanese all iance of 1902.

Whether this pol icy was formulated by

accident or design is not and cannot be known.

I t , at any rate, proved

to be one o f good fortune for the future foreign relations o f England.
Japan, however, was not the only Eastern problem to face Rosebery.
He was confronted with the problem of p laying Russia off against Japan
and yet remaining friendly enough toward her that some sort of entente
would perhaps become possible.

In order to partially accomplish this

Rosebery reached an agreement with Russia concerning British and
Russian spheres o f influence in the Pamirs mountain area of Afghanistan.
These conflicting spheres of influence had long been a bone of contention
between the two nations but an agreement signed in 1887 had given a
temporary respite to affairs leading to a dangerous situation.

For more

than half a century the British had advanced on the northwestern frontier
of India toward Afghanistan.

The Russians were pushing toward the same

area, moving southeast from the Caspian Sea.

Since Afghani stan was the

immediate buffer to India�. , the British had a vested interest in its
well being, considered it their sphere of influence, and were opposed
to any efforts of the Russians to exert their influence over it.
70The Saint James Gazette2_ in Will iam Langer ' s Diplomacy of Imperialism
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf , 1935) , p. 175.
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The crisis of 1885 had arisen when Russia claime d , as part o f their
Empire, Pend j eh , in the northwestern corner of Afghanistan.

War was

averted by careful diplomacy and in 1887 a definite frontier was
established by treaty for that particular area of contention.

This

agreement was now refined and extended by the Rosebery government in
the fall of 1894.

As part of a general d ip lomatic move toward closer

relations with Russia, the Pamirs Agreement . was negotiated in order to
define the northeastern border of Afghanistan.

The agreement , in

general terms , provided for a l ine to be drawn running from Lake Victoria
eastward to the Chinese frontier. *

The border was to be marked out by

a joint technical commission composed of British , Russian and Afghan
members.

The commission was also instructed to report on the situation

at the Chinese frontier in order to help the British and Russian
governments agree with China on the juncture of the Afghan-Chines e
border.

Britain and Russia also pledged in the agreement to rrabstain

from exercis ing any pol itical influence or control:,·. the former
(England) to the north , the latter (Russia) to the south, o f the above
l ine of demarcation

•

.

.

u71

0
The British also agreed that the area of

Afghanistan which lay in the British sphere of influence between Nindu
Kush and Lake Victoria would not be annexed by Great Britain nor would
it be fortified.

The whole agreement was contingent upon the agreement

o f the Ameers of Afghanistan and Bakhara.
and the treaty was completed.

Their agreement was obtained

The l ine drawn in 1895 still marks the

present border of Afghanistan.
71

Great Britain, Parl iamentary Papers , Volume CIX, Treaty Series IX,
cmd. 7643, "Agreement Between the Government s of Great Britain and Russia
With Regard to Spheres of Influence of the Two Countries in the Region o f
the Ramirs " , p . 8.
*
Lake Victoria i s in the extreme northeastern corner of Afghanistan,
just west of the point where the borders of Kashmir , Afghanistan, and China
. meet.
It is the source of the AB-I-Panja River , at an altitude of 1 7 , 753 feet.

38
In conmenting on this agreement after Rosebery ' s fal l , the Review
of Reviews noted that :
No prime mini ster, not even Mr. Gladstone, came so near
establishing that hearty good understanding with Russia
which is the fundamental basis of any sound foreign policy
for England. To replace suspicion by trust and to substitute
friendly confidence for d istrust was a great thing to have
done even if it lasted only some few months. 72
Perhaps it i s true that no other Prime Minister had come so close to
Russia.

The P.amirs agreement had been designed as a stepping stone

toward a rappr ochement with Rus sia , and this larger goal was not
achieved.

England was to wait twelve years more before such an entent e ,

under another Liberal ministry, became a reality.

72 11The Record of the Rosebery Administration,rr Review of Review s ,
August , 1 8 9 5 , p . 1 9 6 .

CHAPTER V .

THE BEGI�I�G OF ISOLATIO�

It

is d i fficult

to say whether the

d e s i r e for raoorochement with

Russia was a product of the new isolation in which England found h e r s e l f
by mid summer of 1894 o r whether it w a s pursued
development.

independently o f that

Rosebery had turned away from a pro- German attitude in

connection with h i s

South African policy,

with the other European powers

and had refused to

in the Far Eastern situation.

attempts to reach an acconunodation with Russia

came

cooperate
The

in the f a l l .

One authority attributes English isolation to t h e clumsiness o f the
Rosebery administration concerning the Anglo-Congo agreement.
same author imp l i e s

an inaccurate conclusion.

aroused German r e sentment and had

lasting break with England.
the German foreign office

caused Germany briefly

This attitude

is

Germany did not d e s ire a
exhibited

to Baron Von Heyking,

in a

letter from

the German Consul-General

Written more than a month after the Anglo-Congo

letter stated

This i s

Although Article III o f the Anglo- Congo

to unite with France on the Egyptian que·s t ion ,

in Cairo.

This

that Anglo-German cooperation ceased after 1894

because o f Germany ' s desire to end the established entente.

treaty had

73

fiasco,

the

that by agreeing with the Khed ive ' s anti-English att itude

Von Heyking:

73
w i l liam Longe r ,
Knop f ,

1 93 5) , p.

The Dipl oma cy o f Im
pe r i a l i s� (�ew York:

Alfred A.

145.
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40

•

•

•

might incur the danger of joining the French

repre sentative in permanent opposition t o the British
one,

and this would not suit our general pol icy

74

In another letter between the two d ip l omats Von Heyking was informed
that for Germany to

set herself in "open and permanent" antagonism

toward England would
be neither in consonance with the tradit ional close
relationship between the two nations,

nor with the

feelings of our a s s ociates in the Triple A l l iance.
These references

(and many more could be cited)

75

to Anglo- German

cooperation indicate that it was not Germany ' s wish for the Anglo-German
entente t o cease.

Another author has written that England ' s isolation

was a p lanned situat ion, and goes on t o say that July 9 ,
11historic date" in British history.

1894 , was an

This conclusion i s drawn because

on that day Lord Rosebery spurned a German apology for past event s ,
offered by Count Deym,

the Austrian ambassador.

By doing so Rosebery

marked the end of a more or l e s s consistent Anglo-Austro- German
cooperation begun in 1 7 9 2 .

I t i s concluded b y the same author ,

that upon this d a t e , July 9 ,
i�olated.

1894,

England became intentionally

76

There had been,

i n late nineteenth century England , a good many

influences pulling England and Germany apart.
'

colonies had for years rankled Englishmen,
alike.

74
T.

The German desire for

Liberal and Conservative

Even though the Liberal party under Rosebery ' s guidance in 1894

had many inner di fference s ·,

E.

then,

Baron Von Rotenham to Baron Von Heykind ,

s.

(London:
75
76

it was s o l i d on one point--opposition t o a

Dugdale

(ed. ) ,

Harper and Bro s . ,

rbid . ,

July 5 ,

see A.

J. P.

June 2 9 ,

1894,

German Diplomatic Documents 18 7 1 - 1 914, VII
1929) ,

1894 , pp.
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300.
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Taylor, The Struggl e for Ma s tery in Europe 1848- 1 9 1 8

( Oxford , The Clarendon Pre s s ,

1 9 54 ) , p .

352.
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strong German friendship.

The older Cobden-oriented Glad stonian

Libera l s were opposed to entangling alliances,
any nature.

The Liberal- Imperia l i s t s ,

ententes or agreements o f

of whom Lord Rosebery was the

acknowl edged leader, were opposed to an a l l iance or an understanding with
.
Germany because the colonial inter e s t s of the two nations were t o o often
at odds.

It becomes evident ,

the part of England in

1894-95

then, why there was no great effort on
to continue her previous p o l icy o f

diplomatic cooperation with Germany.
Toward France the English were ambivalent.

After the Anglo-Congo

episode England showed a lukewarm desire to acquire an entente with
France.

In the s ununer and fall of

1894

attempts were made to reach an

un . erstanding concerning the Nile valley, but failed when Lord Rosebery
turned down an agreement concerning the problem.
here,

The French ,

failing

then launched expiditions toward the Sudan, according t o one

scholar,

in order to force England to declare a de facto recognition o f

French rights i n the valley o f the Nile.

77

This action, however, a s we

sha l l later see , had the exact opposite of i t s desired effect and
precipitated a serious dip lomat ic crisis with England.
England then pursued her attempt at rapprochement with Russia.

The

British negotiated the Ramirs Agreement with Russia which eased tensions
in Afghanistan,

and when the Armenian massacres broke out,

attempted to

�ork with both France and Russia t o right the s ituation a l though efforts
came t o naught.

Lorj Rosebery ' s desire for Russian friendship w a s

illustrated i n a speech he gave at the Guildha l l on November
Referring to the Sino-Japanese war he said :

77

Ibid . , PP• .353, 354.

11 , 1894.

42

In this delicate and difficult busine s s we have acted
In itself that cordial action
hand in hand with Russia
with Russia is a fact of which we may rejoice. Ever since
this Government has been in power our relations with Russia
have been more cordial than I ever remember them to have
been. We have , a s nearly a s p o s s ible , I hope and believe,
terminated the long standing d i fficulty with regard to the
limitations of our spheres o f influence in Central Asia
(a reference to the Ramirs agreement) . I ag�ee that if
Russia and England can march with cordiality and without
suspicion in Asiatic affair s , one great step toward the
peace of the world will have been taken. 78
•

•

•

These attemp t s at friendship with Russia brightened a few times
then lapsed into nothingnes s because of Russia ' s d isinterest.

This is

attributable to the fact that the developing Franco-Russian entente
o f the last four years had culminated in 1894 in a formal a l l iance,
'

·
a lthough this fact remained for sometime a secret . �(

The British then

remained aloof, going their way without a l liance or entente until after
the turn of the century.

Planned disconnection from Germany and a

lukewarm attitude toward France and Russia ended in unexpected and
complete isolation.

The responsibility for this state o f affairs must

lie with Lord Rosebery but it i s doubtful that things would have been
much different in another Minister ' s hands--events were moving too
quickly.

7 8The Times · (London) , November 1 1 , 1894 , p. 6.
*

As late a s 1898 the German ambassador to Vienna , for exampl e ,
•rfelt sure there was no formal a l l iance. n Rumloed t o Salisbury ,
December 5 , 1898 ;. British Documents on the Origin of the War a s cited in
S idney Foy, The Origins of the World War (New York: Macmillan Co. ,
1948) , p . 1 2 1 , note 33 .

CHAPTER VI
AFRICA II
Although Britain would later emerge from her isolation with the
development of the Triple Entente,

this was still a decade in the future.

During Rosebery ' s administration unresolved colonial conflicts between
the English and French made a real understanding impossible.

Thus in

the fall of 1894 Lord Rosebery faced the very problem which he had
earlier tried to prevent by signing the Anglo-Congo Treaty--French
intrusion into the Sudan.
France, refusing to recognize the Sudan as a British sphere of
influence, held that if the Sudan belonged to anyone,

it belonged to

Turkey (because of her theoretical suzerainity over Egypt),
British had no more�right to be there than the French.

and the

Since the British

were there, however, the French felt that they must be there too.
the Sudan was,

i n fact, ownerless, the French reasoned, then it was

anyone's game and the British ought not to complain.
reasoning,

If

With this

then, the French launched an expedition of exploration toward

the disputed area.

This was done,

according to one author,

in order to

force the British into recognition o f French claims in the Sudan and,
so doing , to bring the British occupation of Egypt

(which the French had

always resented) before an European conference. 79
79A.

(Oxford :

J. P.

Taylor , The Struggle For Mastery in Europe 1848-1918

The Clarendon Press,

1954), p.

354.

by

It is hard to bel ieve that the French government would engage in an
undertaking a s dangerous a s this with such a tenuous and hypothetical
Lord Rosebery had warned o f the danger involved in this p o l icy

policy.

as early as November of 1894, when he

said in a speech at the Guildhal l :

The last difficulty to which I will refer i s t h i s .
is the danger of armed explorers.
ent

It

At this moment in the contin

of Africa, we arc a l l l i a b l e to a real danger from the
I am not charging any

aberrations o f armed exploration
nation particularly
this
peace

exploration
•

•

•

Bo

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

but what I would say i s thi s - - that

constitutes a real danger to European

France was engaging upon further exploration o f the very kind Ros ebery
had warned against.

He then felt he must impress upon the French govern-

ment the fact that Britain would not yield and it was for this reason
that Sir Edward Grey d e l ivered h i s famous Declaration in the House of
Connno ns on the evening of March 2 8 ,

1895.

I n that Declaration Grey

stated that "the British and Egyptian spheres o f influence cover the
who l e o f the Nile waterway1r and that the "advance of a French expedition
into an area over which our claims have been known for so long (5 years)
would be not merely an incons i stent and unexpected act but it must be
perfectly well known to the French government that it would be an
*
unfriendly act :�and would be s o viewed by England. 8 1
These were exceedingly strong words for the
among friendly nations.

language o f dip lomacy

The s i gnificance which they carried , and were

meant to carry when they were spoken, was gauged by Lord Rosebery in a
speech at Epsom three years

80rhe Times
81

later when he said rrthe word

(London ) , November 1 0 ,

1894,

p.

' unfriend ly '

6.

Great Britain, 4 Parl iamentary Debates XXXI I ,

18 9 5 ,

pp.

405-406.

*
This language was so strong that it was called by the Radical

M.

P.

Henry Lalouchere a "qua s i declaration of war11 against France.

which socia l l y has, perhaps, no particular meaning,

or perhaps too

conunon a meaning, is among diplomatists a word of exceptional weight
and gravity. rr82

Grey ' s use of this strong language has been questioned

by many writers.
"language

I

Grey's own explanation,

years later, was that the

had thought of using about west Africa

(with reference to

French activities there) was not suitable to the question of the Nile
valley.

I

" r- -

\;}/

ther��ansferred to the subject of the Nile the firmness

I

•

had been authorized to show about competing claims in West Africa
Lord Rosebery stated, however,

in 1898,

•

.

.· n�3

that he was 11'ersonally and

ministerially responsib l e " for the Declaration. 84

The purpose then

was to inform France, and to inform her in no uncertain terms,

that

the British considered a l l the Nile valley as a British sphere of influence
that was not open to the intrusion of any foreign power.
Queen Victoria, visiting in France at the time,

tel egraphed Lord

Rosebery that:
Your telegram is rather disquieting.

While trusting

that the government will preserve a strong attitude against

French encroachments, I hope crisis may be averted

It

•

•

•

would be very awkward if compl ications arose with a country

in which I am now residing and receiving marked courtesy
and attention. B S

The French received the Grey Declaration with some surprise.
the dispute over the Anglo-Congo Treaty in the spring of 1894,

Following

negotiations

with France over African affairs had been carried on through the sununer
and into the following winter.

According to one authority the British had

delimited an Egyptian sphere of influence extending as far south as
82The Times (London) ,

October 13,

1898,

83 sir Edward Grey,
Twenty-Five Years

p. 19.

84The Times (London), October 13,

p.

10.

(Frederick A.

1898,

third series,

II

(Longrnans,

1925),

p. 10.

85
Queen Victoria to Lord Rosebery, March 29,

Victoria,

Stokes Co.,

Letters of Queen
1895 .
Green and Company , 1931), p. 493.

Khartoum and a separate British sphere farther upriver extending
northward from Uganda to Fashoda.

Thus a large area along the Nile

River would be open between these two point s .

The earl ier d ispute had

actually involved the portion of the Sudan upriver from Fashoda lying
between Abyssinia and the Congo and just north of British Uganda.
delimitation of the two spheres just indicated would

The

seem to show that

British negotiators were a s suming that the specifically British ( i . e.
non-Egyptian) sphere had derived from an extension o f their claims northward
from British Uganda.
and Khartoum.

The significance lies in the gap between Fashoda

Rosebery, however, was not thinking in the same terms a s

h i s negotiators.

Already in June he had declared

86
Egypt and Egypt i s the Nile. rc

"that the Nile i s

H i s previous initiative in the Congo

d i spute clearly reveals an intention to build a north- south bridge
connecting British claimed areas.

Thus his response to the d e l imitation

of spheres embodied in the unsigned draft agreement arranged by h i s
negotiators w a s t o repudiate terms which recognized that fatal gap along
the upper Nile--hence Grey ' s Declaration.

The unsolved mystery l i e s in

why he had permitted to proceed so far in recognizing a position with

·

which he was not in agreement.
At this moment in history England had deliberately put herself adrift
from her entente with Germany and was looking toward France and Russia
for a d iplomatic understanding.

Yet in this very s ituation Lord Rosebery

adopted an attitude just short of warlike in order to protect British
colonial interests from France.

This illustrates that in foreign policy

under Rosebery's leadership there could b e no diplomatic cooperation or
8

Knopf,

6william
193 5 ) ,

Longer, The Diplomacy of Imperiali s m (New York :

p.

138.

Alfred A.

alliance with any power if, in the last analysis, British co lonial
�

intere s t s would have to be sacrificed.

This was true earlier (in 1894)

with Germany, and it proved to be true again in 1895 with France.
Therein lies the cause for no entente or all iance being effected while
Rosebery was in office.

France and Russia were aware of Rosebery's

attitude and thus their attempts toward friendship were no warmer than
Britain's were.
The French ambas sador stated that "he could not but regard the
rr
declaration made in the House of Conunons as a 'prise en p o s s e ssion •
on the part of the British government.

To this Lord Kimberly replied

that he "could not see that the reiteration of a claim already made
known to the French government could be regarded a s a 'prise en p o s s e s sion. 1 1 r87
Fortunately the French government did not make an i s s u e of the affair and
it momentarily passed over.

The British,

under the succeeding govern-

ment of Lord Salisbury remained firm in their determination to hold the
en�ire burden and �he question was not resolved until the Fashoda crisis
in 1898.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

AND

EVALUATION

The administration of the Earl of Rosebery fell on June 2 2 ,
rrsick of h i s colleagues I

d i s sent ion (particularly w.

1895.

v. Harcourt ) ) h e

7
took advantage o f an unimportant defeat i n the Commons to r e s i gn. rr 8
The nunimportant defeaer was over the question of the censure of the
war mini ster,
department.

Sir i:�nry Camp bel I-Bannerman,

for incompet ency in h i s

In 1891 the British army had switched from r i f l e s using

black powder to those using cordite.

The contention of the Conservatives

in 1894 was that the Liberal government ,

first under Glad stone and then

Rosebery, had kept in supply only enough cordite cartridges for 1 1 0 , 000
men,

instead of enough for the 3 9 0 , 000 men actually in the British army . 88

For this failure the opposition moved,
Bannerman ' s salary by LlOO.

on June 2 1 ,

to reduce Campbell-

The vote in the Commons was a s follow s :

For the reduction

- 132

against the reduction The majority for
Not an important defeat by normal

125
7 89

---

standar d s ,

t h i s seemingly minor

question s i gnaled the exclusion of the Liberal party from politics for a
decade.

The London Times described the situation:

48

49

The goverrunent at first intended to carry on but her
unanimous consent changed i t s mind and decided to resign
when it was decided the war minister had been insulted
and if this could not be wiped out, he must res ign,
9
the goverrunent res ign a s we l l . O

and

On the 22nd o f June Rosebery submitted his res ignation to the Queen,
where it was accepted inunediately.
In the conunents f o l l owing Rosebery ' s fall
was mixe d ,

from power the reaction

Some felt Rosebery had

as it had been at h i s accension.

An article in the

muddled h i s way through h i s tenure of office.

Fortnightly Review criticized Rosebery by conunenting that

rrthe short-

comings which have shown themselves in h i s short record as premier are
due to a lack o f experience and self-assertivene s s . rr91

The Nation

felt that Lord Rosebery had been rrthe Melbourne or Palmer ston type of
minister who did not think anything mattered very rauch and was not very
sure of h i s conviction. "9

2

A d i f ferent opinion,

however , was expressed

by the Review o f Reviews :
In view o f Lord Rosebery ' s effort in 1 8 9 4 to open an A l l
British Route from the Cape t o Cairo ,

i t would b e difficult to

conceive a bolder model o f foreign p o l i cy .

The new epoch in

foreign p o l icy i s his work and in that d e c i s ive idea he
rendered a service to his country with which few achievements
3
in office w i l l compare. 9
Whatever the opinion of the journa l i st s ,

Lord Rosebery had managed

to lead the nation for a period o f fifteen month s ,
'

months he held firm control

of foreign affairs.

foreign minister, but as one author has written,

90
The Times
9 l c'Lord

August 1 ,
92
93
p.

229.

(London) June 2 4 ,

1895, p.

anci

in those fifteen

Lord Ximberly was the
he wa s :

6.

Rosebery and the Liberal Party, 11 Fortnightly Review, Vo l . LXIV.
236.

1895, p .

The Nat ion,

Vol.

LXI I I ,

October 1 5 ,

1896.

1'Disraeli o f Liberalism, r r Review o f Reviews , Vo l .

XIX, February,

189 9 ,

50
competent but of no great force of character

(and ) was bound

to be little m��e than an instrument in his (Rosebery ' s )

hands.

In fact the control of foreign affairs remained in

the ?rime Minister ' s hands.

94

Rosebery controlled foreign affairs indeed,
consent of the Cabinet.

often times without the

For this be received much criticism, from both

his contemporaries and future historians alike.
To evaluate this control of foreign affairs is not an easy task.
Rosebery faced no crisis of great import such as Fashoda, but during his
tenure of office England did face serious questions.

Probably the most

serious crisis of that period was when Sir Edward Grey, under Rosebery ' s
instructions, issued his famous Declaration t o France that penetration
of the Nile valley would constitute an "unfriendly act'r toward Britain.
Here it is quite possible that war could have ensued , as it nearly did
for the same reason at Fashoda three years later.

This only crisis of

any importance under Rosebery was due of course to his firm conviction
that the Sudan was a British sphere of influence.
or last minister,

however,

He was not the first

to hold such a conviction.

In other affairs Rosebery ' s decision not to intervene at the signing
of the Treaty of Shimenonseki turned out to be a wise one, for by that
intervention every European power except England incurred the enmity of
Japan.
Concerning other questions, Lord Rosebery did what he must have felt
in his own mind to have been best.
for England's isolation of
and failed,

Doran Co.,

1894-1904.

H e broke the entente with Germany

because of his only lukewarm attempts,

France and Russia.

94c.

He was responsible to a large degree

He acted as he did in these cases because he felt he

T. Raymond,

1923 ) ,

p.

to attain one with

The Life of Lord Rosebery

142.

( New

York:

George H.
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was protecting the life-blood of his country--British Imperialism.

His

blundering in the Anglo-Congo Treaty is almost inexcusable, but there
probably was no permanent or important , at the time, damage done.
However , one authority has pointed out that after rrthe collapse of the
Anglo-Congolese Treaty a hopeless muddle seemed to overtake the foreign
off ice.

rr

95

Perhaps Lord Rosebery was an opportunist , taking action to meet only
a present s ituation, with l ittLe regard to future consequences .

With his

vision somewhat blurred by his burning imperialism this seems more l ikely
than not, to have · been the case.

Perhaps too things would have been

different had he possessed a larger maj ority (the most he ever had was
forty) and a united Cabinet.

With those assets in his favor , he might

have been able to have wielded a more stable and lasting policy.
The Review of Reviews sununed up Rosebery's situation:
He was not the head o f his government. He was the figure
head of their govern.�ent. He was not a minister who had
established an a scendary in politics before r i s ing to the
highest office, who had chosen his colleagues and given the
organic impress to his own Cabinet in its formation. He was
l e s s a Premier supported by a Cabinet than a Premier in the
custody of a Cabinet. There was open and arrogant sedition;
there was desertion, opposition, lack of sympathy, hopeless
incompatability of temper. 96
Lord Rosebery ' s Premiership has been accused of being sterile o f
accomplishment.

Whether one accepts this view depends on how much

importance is attached to the events that arose under his leadership.
Had he been Prime Minister at a different time, in a d i fferent day, he
might have had the fame of Palmerston or Disrael i .

But that i s in the

realm o f speculation and we wil l never know, for h i story is a s it i s ,
and we must judge those who contribute to its never ending stream accordingly.
9 5Robert Rhodes Jame s , Rosebery (London·:·
1 963 ) , p. 3 7 7 .

Wiedenfeld and Nicolson,

9 6rrnisraeli o f Liberalism, er Review of Review s , Vol.XIX, February,
1 8 9 9 ' p . 230.
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Lord Rosebery himself was not sorry to leave the seat of power.

As

he wrote some years later:
There are two supreme pleasures in life. One is idea l ,
the other i s real. The ideal is when a man receives the
seals of office from his Sovereign. The real is when he hands
them back. 97
And thi s , perhaps , is the best corranentary of all on the Premiership
of the Earl of Rosebery.

97

Robert Rhodes James , Rosebery (London:
1963 ) , p. 384.
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